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A LEGAL LEGACY THAT OPENS THE WAY TO JUSTICE IN
CHALLENGING PLACES AND TIMES
Stephen J. Rapp
Charles Jalloh’s The Legal Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
reminds us of the great usefulness of the hybrid model of international
criminal justice. It is very timely when so many of the mass atrocities
committed in today’s world—in Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, and Myanmar
(except for forced deportation)—are outside the reach of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), either because of non-membership of the territorial
states or the blockage of the UN Security Council.
Indeed, even where the atrocities are committed on the territory of ICC
member states, the hybrid approach can be viewed as a form of
“complementarity” that avoids taking the situation to The Hague but does not
rely exclusively on national trials. It can be a better alternative than a single
global court in The Hague that is expensive, distant, and easy for local leaders
to demonize, and national courts where it can be very hard to properly try
powerful actors, particularly if these courts were dysfunctional before the
violence and were further disabled by it.
The usual arguments for hybrid justice focus on the advantages of
locating a court near the victims and affected communities but with a
structure that ensures the necessary capacity and will to deliver independent
justice for core international crimes. From my own experience at the SCSL,
I have seen how the mixing of national and international personnel was a
“win-win” in building capacity because we were able to learn from each
other’s knowledge and experience in ways not easily achieved by any other
means.
I also saw how the hybrid model allowed us to overcome the “political
will” challenge and prosecute and build public understanding of our case
against the leadership of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) for serious
violations committed while they fought on the “pro-democracy” side of the
internal conflict. My friends in Sierra Leone tell me that this delivered an
enduring message that no one should attack innocent civilians, no matter
what the cause, and as a result the country has survived two power-changing
elections without lethal violence.
Charles Jalloh’s book makes the case that beyond these advantages, the
greatest may be on the legal front. In particular, he shows how the SCSL’s
decisions on head-of-state immunity and amnesties have profoundly changed
the international legal landscape. He draws a direct line from the SCSL’s
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denial of immunity to President Charles Taylor of Liberia, which was not a
state party of the SCSL, to the ICC’s decisions on the immunity of President
Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, which was not a state party to the ICC. While both
courts were treaty-based, the state parties of which recognize head-of-state
immunity in their national systems, it was the international character of the
SCSL and ICC that extended their legal reach to enable the arrests and trials
of even the highest officeholders.
As Jalloh acknowledges, the ICC head-of-state immunity decisions have
been criticized by several states and many legal commentators. It is possible
that they could be overturned if the opposing states were successful in
building sufficient support for a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution
asking for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
then if the ICJ opined that the ICC immunity decisions were incorrect. But
would the ICJ wish to be seen as closing the door to accountability for highlevel officials when it previously took care to leave it partially open in the
Arrest of Warrant Case of 2002 by holding that immunities of such officials
do not apply “before certain international criminal courts where they have
jurisdiction?”
But even if the ICJ were to opine that immunities of certain serving
officials still apply in treaty-based courts, the legal legacy of the SCSL is
rock solid as to whether such courts can apply customary international law,
even where that law is not reflected in the statutes or constitutions of the
ratifying states. This has important implications on immunity of former
heads-of-state, amnesties, and retroactivity of statutes in a number of atrocity
crime situations where the hybrid model has been under active consideration
as a practical solution.
In the Gambia, the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission
(TRRC) has been busy with the first phase of transitional justice after the
electoral defeat and exile of President Yahya Jammeh, who ruled the country
from 1994 to 2017. The TRRC is mandated to complete its work by 2021 and
then identify and recommend “prosecution of persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for human rights violations and abuses” committed when
Jammeh was in power.1 The hybrid model has strong support in the Gambia,
in part because of the legal limitations of the Gambian domestic justice
system.
The present Gambian constitution immunizes Jammeh and those
involved in his 1994 coup d’etat and in the transition that followed. This
immunity could be overcome if the proposed new constitution were ratified.2
1 Truth, Reparations And Reconciliation Act, Act No. 9, GMB-2017-L-110052, Dec. 13, 2017 (the
Gambia).
2 The proposed new constitution failed to receive the necessary votes in the Gambian parliament
in October 2020, leaving the 1997 Constitution in place with its provisions granting immunity to ex-
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However, there is also the problem that Gambian law during the Jammeh
regime did not include crimes against humanity, torture, or enforced
disappearance. While Article 15(2) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) allows retroactive application of statutes that
reflect the “law recognized by the community of nations,” there is an
additional legal obstacle in the West African region that arose during the
preparations for the trial of former Chadian President Hissene Habré in
Senegal.3
In June 2006, the African Union Summit asked Senegal to try Habré,
then in exile in Senegal, “on behalf of Africa.” There was not a problem with
his immunity as a former head of state because Chad had waived the
immunity, and there was no amnesty applicable to his alleged conduct. The
problem arose over the retroactive application of Senegal’s 2007 statute by
which it intended to try Habré for crimes committed in Chad during
1982−1990.
In November 2010, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) ruled that it was a violation of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights for Senegal to try Habré under a
retroactive domestic statute and that this could only be accomplished by
following the international practice of establishing an ad hoc or special court.
This was subsequently achieved by an international agreement between the
African Union and Senegal to create a hybrid court—the Extraordinary
African Chambers (EAC), staffed entirely by Senegalese personnel except
for two international judges, one to preside at trial and the other on appeal.
The hybrid model is also under active consideration in Liberia, where
its TRC in 2009 recommended a Special Court like the SCSL, but where the
presence and power in the Liberian Legislature of former warlords and their
followers have blocked progress. Now thanks to a public mobilization of
support for accountability for war crimes and economic crimes, more than
2/3 of the members of the Liberian House of Representatives are sponsoring
a resolution calling for a Special Court. At a conference of civil society
organizations in Monrovia in November 2018, the hybrid model was seen as
offering many advantages, particularly in overcoming domestic legal
limitations. These include the amnesty that was adopted by the Liberian
legislature before President Taylor’s departure in August 2003, the absence
of international crimes in domestic statutes, and the constitutional guarantee
President Jammeh and the members of the junta that ruled with him during 1994−1997. However, the
immunity provision was invalidated by the Gambia Supreme Court in the case of Yankuba Touray, a junta
member charged with the murder of a political opponent. The decision was announced on January 27,
2021, with full reasoning issued on March 19, 2021, and was based on the incompatibility of the immunity
provision with the protection of the human right to life. State v. Yankuba, Case No. SC CR/001/2020,
Judgment (Mar. 19, 2021).
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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of trial by jury—so important for ordinary crimes but difficult to apply in war
crimes cases given the challenges to juror impartiality and security in a
society where alleged perpetrators present themselves as protectors of their
communities.
A hybrid court to provide accountability for the mass atrocities
committed in South Sudan since a brutal civil conflict began in December
2013 was promised by the government and the armed opposition in the peace
agreement of August 2015 and the revitalized peace agreement of September
2018. Article V of both agreements provides for an African Union Hybrid
Court for South Sudan (AUHCSS), with the statute to be negotiated between
the government and the AU, and with the AU empowered to enact the statute
if the government does not agree. Article V specifically mandates that the
statute incorporate international crimes and allow prosecution without regard
to amnesties or immunities based on official position.4 The AUHCSS appears
to be a vehicle that would make the maximum effective use of the legal
legacy of the SCSL. However, to date, there has been an absence of the
domestic political will, regional (and AU) support, and the active
international engagement that made it possible for the SCSL to be
established.
But the hybrid model does not require political will by all local actors
or active engagement by all international partners. Where there is sufficient
will and engagement of key parties, a critical mass can be reached to build a
judicial institution based on the legal legacy of the SCSL. This could happen
even in the situation of Syria, the site of ongoing atrocities that are the worst
of this twenty-first century.
In 2019, the Swedish government called for the creation of an
international court to try European citizens accused of committing crimes
while in the service of Da’esh (aka ISIS) in Syria, many of whom are in the
custody of Syrian Kurdish forces after the defeat of Da’esh in eastern Syria.
From subsequent discussions, and from a published legal opinion of Prof. Dr.
P.A. Nollkamper that was requested by the Dutch government, it became
clear that the legal basis for such a court was to be the “pooling” of the active
personality jurisdiction of member states to try their own nationals for these
extra-territorial crimes. As noted in the Dutch opinion, the implementation
of the concept would face many practical difficulties, but it was legally

4 Compare Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of The
Sudan and The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, art. V, Jan. 9,
2005 with Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (RARCSS), art. V, Sept. 12, 2018.
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sound: “With such a treaty, the parties would transfer the jurisdiction they
each have over members of ISIS to the tribunal.”5
The concept ran into opposition because it seemed designed to avoid the
states’ responsibility to take back their own citizens because their
governments were afraid of political repercussions if the individuals were
soon freed by domestic courts because weak evidence of serious criminal
conduct could result in short sentences or acquittals. It was also opposed
because of the violation of the principle that an international court should
pursue equally those alleged to have committed serious crimes on whatever
side they fought.
At the same time European states were considering pooling their active
personality jurisdiction to bring to trial European members of Da’esh in a
multi-state court, European prosecutors were achieving historic but limited
success in using universal jurisdiction to bring to trial Syrian regime
perpetrators in European courts. These two developments have opened the
door to the consideration of a multi-state court that would pool all of the state
parties’ jurisdictions of whatever form—active, protective, and universal--to
achieve complete justice for the victims of the crimes in Syria. This idea was
proposed in a widely-circulated but unpublished paper by Dr. Ingrid Elliot,
MBE, issued in May 2018 and titled “A Briefing Note—Pooled ExtraTerritorial Court Option for Syria.”
Charles Jalloh’s book teaches us that the best way to create a pooled
jurisdiction court for Syria would be by engaging the broader “international
community” in its establishment, as it was in the birth of the of SCSL—the
statute of which was negotiated between Sierra Leone and the UN SecretaryGeneral (UNSG), the latter acting under direction from the UNSC in
Resolution 1315. Of course, unlike Sierra Leone, Syria as the territorial state
would certainly not now wish to be a state party. But Senegal, the state party
of the treaty-based EAC, was not the territorial state of Habré’s crimes. And
yes, Russia would veto any UNSC resolution like UNSCR 1315. But when
the Cambodia tribunal was created, China was not supportive, and the
direction for the UNSG to negotiate came from the UN General Assembly.
Consider that the UN General Assembly has already approved and
funded a mechanism to provide a foundation for criminal accountability as to
the mass atrocities in Syria. In December 2016, the UNGA adopted
Resolution 71/248 (by a vote of 105−15), creating an International Impartial
Independent Mechanism (IIIM)—a proto-Office of the Prosecutor for the

5 Prof. Dr. P.A. Nollkaemper, Advies International Tribunaal ISIS 7 (July 22, 2019),
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2019/07/24/advies-internationaal-tribunaal-isis
(“Bij een dergelijk verdrag zouden de partijen de rechtsmacht die zij elk hebben over leden van ISIS
overdragen aan het tribunaal.”).
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international crimes committed in Syria since March 2011.6 The IIIM has
since been hard at work building case files that could be ready for trial. This
IIIM could thus provide a UNGA-approved core for the investigative and
prosecutorial capacity of a Special Court for Syria—a treaty-based court with
a statute negotiated pursuant to the UNGA’s direction to the UNSG to seek
agreement with those states wishing to pool their jurisdiction over crimes
committed in Syria.
There is also another route by which the “international community”
could be engaged in the creation of a hybrid court that would benefit from
the jurisprudence of the SCSL. The Executive Council of the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), representing 193 state
parties, adopted a Decision on July 7, 2020, based on the findings of its
Identification and Investigation Team (IIT) about the use of sarin and
chlorine in a number of specific attacks in Syria, that “emphasize[d] the
importance of bringing to justice those individuals responsible for the uses of
chemical weapons found by the IIT to have been perpetrated by the Syrian
Arab Republic, including those who ordered such attacks.”7 The Decision
noted that the OPCW had concluded a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the Syria IIIM which had its “full support” and to which it would
provide relevant information. Finally, it promised “the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings
in accordance with international law.”8
The OPCW Executive Council provided Syria with 90 days to respond,
and if Syria failed to redress the situation, it recommended that the
Conference of State Parties (CSP) take “appropriate action” when it convenes
in November−December 2020. Given the language of the OPCW Executive
Council Decision, it would be the logical next step for the CSP to call on state
parties “to exercise their criminal jurisdiction in accordance with
international law, including by forming an international court (or Special
Court for Syria) that would pool their jurisdiction and resources to ‘bring to
justice the individuals responsible.’”
The experience of the SCSL would provide useful lessons for such a
Special Court for Syria (SCS) as to the processes of appointment,
management, and cooperation, to ensure an impartial and effective judicial
institution. Of course, an SCS should also leave open the door for a posttransition Syria to join the court, bringing in its jurisdiction and judicial
personnel and fully benefiting from the hybrid model.
6

G.A. Res. 71/248 (Dec. 21, 2016).
OPCW Executive Council Adopts Decision Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical
Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic, OPCW (July 9, 2020), https://www.opcw.org/mediacentre/news/2020/07/opcw-executive-council-adopts-decision-addressing-possession-and-use.
8 OPCW Decision EC-94/DEC.2 (July 9, 2020).
7
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Some fear that we are at the end of the age of accountability that saw
the successes of ad hoc and hybrid courts and the operationalization of the
ICC. Charles Jalloh shows how the jurisprudence of one of those courts, the
SCSL, has provided a valuable and useful legal legacy—one that can open
the way to justice in even more challenging places and times.

